WITTGENSTEIN: IDENTIDAD E INDISCERNIBILIDAD
identity indiscernibility logic properties use.
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My aim in this paper is to combine historical reconstruction withconceptual analysis. What in the first place I intend to show is that,based on a variety of quite smashing arguments, Wittgenstein justdemolishes the set of philosophical misunderstandings that centerround the famous Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles. So I firstintroduce the difficulty in a straightforward way and then I examinesome well known views, in particular those of Bertrand Russell,Gottlob Frege and F. P. Ramsey. I then carry out a detailed reconstructionof Wittgensteins assault on the philosophical use of the logical notion of identity such as he deploys it both in the TractatusLogico-Philosophicus and during some of his lectures, after hisreturn to Cambridge. I finally put forward some criticisms of minein order to show that theWittgensteinian view according to whichthere are no real problems in philosophy but mere conceptual confusionsis in this particular case clearly confirmed.
Tomasini Bassols, A. (2008). WITTGENSTEIN: IDENTIDAD E INDISCERNIBILIDAD. Praxis Filosófica, (26), 13–32. https://doi.org/10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i26.3297
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