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This paper examines critically Ronald Dworkin’s ideas about the apparent conflict between the political ideals of liberty and equality. Following a suggestion by Ruth Marcus, is argued that, contrary to Dworkin’s idea, the acceptance of genuine valorative dilemmas don’t imply an inconsistency in the agent’s system of values

Vargas Duque, G. E. (2011). Is There a Conflict between Liberty and Equality?. Praxis Filosófica, (32), 163–173. https://doi.org/10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i32.3442
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DWORKIN, Ronald (2000). “¿Entran en conflicto la libertad y la igualdad?”, en: Vivir como iguales, editado por P. Barker, Paidós.

DWORKIN, Ronald (1977). Taking rights seriously. Harvard University Press.

KANT, Inmanuel (1993). Metafísica de las costumbres. Barcelona, Altaya.

MARCUS, Ruth. B (1980). “Moral dilemmas and consistency”, en: TheJournal of Philosophy, Vol. 77., No. 3.

MARCUS, Ruth. B (1996) “More about moral dilemmas”, en: Moraldilemmas and moral theory, editado por H. E. Mason, Oxford UniversityPress.

MILL, John.Stuart (1994). Utilitarismo. Barcelona, Altaya.

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