FUTURE CONTINGENTS, BIVALENCE AND EPISTEMIC INDETERMINISM
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The first aim of this paper is to show how Aristotle accepts the principle ofexcluded middle and bivalence in statements about future contingent. Themain consequence of this, against the trivalent positions, is that statementsabout future contingent have no truth value indeterminate: are eithertrue or false. Different indeterministic positions are analyzed in order toshow how these depend on an implausible thesis: i) the application ofthe principle of excluded middle and bivalence in statements about futureresults in determinism. It is proposed that the indeterminism attributed tothese statements is epistemic, not alethic: a subject S does not know at timet before t1 the truth value of statements about future contingent.
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