Does Scientifi c Realism require a comittment with the Correspondence Theory of Truth?
Article Sidebar
Main Article Content
In this paper I Intend to examine a thesis hold by Devitt on the nature of scientific realism. In particular, I shall examine the thesis according to which no theory of truth is constitutive of realism, so that a commitment with realism does not force us to subscribe to a correspondence theory of truth. Were this thesis right, all the antirealist attempts to rebut the claims of scientific realism would be destined to fail since their objections suppose that one of the theories constitutive of realism is the correspondence theory of truth. My intuition is that it is not possible to free scientific realism from its semantic commitments to a correspondence theory. To defend this point of view, I shall show how implausible is the thesis that a realist does not have to subscribe to a correspondence theory since he could adopt, in its place, a redundancy theory of truth. My intuition is that if a realist would subscribe to such theory he would not be able to successfully maintain the ‘independence dimension’ that according to Devitt is constitutive of Realism. Lastly, I shall show two undesirable results of maintaining a realism free from semantics, among them that it is not clear how such a realist can respond to the problem of theory choice and that it is not possible to admit that there are causal relations between our minds and the world –like Devitt suggests- with no intrusions of semantics or without falling into antirealism.
Devitt, Michael (2010) Aberrations of the Realism Debate. En: Putting Metaphysics First. Oxford University Press.
Dummet, Michael (1978). Truth and Other Enigmas (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press).
Fine, Arthur (1986a). The Shaky Game: Einstein, Realism, and the Quantum Theory (Chicago, University of Chicago Press).
Fine, Arthur (1986b). ‘‘Unnatural Attitudes: Realist and Instrumentalist Attachments to Science’’. Mind, 95: 149-77.
Horwich, Paul (2004). Three forms of Realism. En: From a Defl ationary point of view. Clarendon Press, Oxford University.
Laudan, Larry (1981). ‘‘A Confutation of Convergent Realism’’. Philosophy of Science, 48: 19-49. Repr. in Leplin 1984a.
Leeds, Stephen (1978). ‘‘Theories of Reference and Truth’’. Erkenntnis, 13: 111-29.
Putnam, Hilary (1978). Meaning and the Moral Sciences (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul).
Putnam, Hilary (1983). Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers, (Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress).
Rorty, Richard (1979). Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, Princeton University Press).
Tarski, Alfred (1997). La Concepción Semántica de la verdad y los fundamentos de la semántica En: Teorías de la verdad en el siglo XX. Madrid, Tecnos.
Williams, Michael (1993). ‘‘Realism and Scepticism’’. In Haldane and Wright 1993a: 193-214
Downloads
De acuerdo con nuestra política (Licencia Creative Commons CC BY-NC-SA 4.0) los artículos presentados y sometidos al proceso editorial en la revista Praxis Filosófica no tienen costo alguno para sus autores ni retribuciones económicas para la revista. El artículo de carácter inédito, producto de investigación o de algún proyecto que se presente a Praxis Filosófica, no podrá estar sometido a otro proceso de publicación durante el proceso que se lleve en nuestra revista.