Set-Theoretical Reconstruction Of Wittgenstein’s Pictorial Theory of The Tractatus
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In this paper I intend to present a reconstruction à la Suppes of the pictorial, representational or figurative theory of language proposed by L. Wittgenstein in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus to show the limits of thought, or more precisely of language as a sensitive expression of thought, on the presupposition of the non-explicit existence on the part of its author of an isomorphism between the structure of language, as a sensible expression of thought, and that of the world, so that in order for language to figure something of the world, it is required that between both structures, that of language and that of the world, an h-isomorphic function can be established not only at the level of their respective domains, since both have the same cardinality, but also between their predicates and relators, given their same ariety. With it I intend to account for the complex pictorial or figurative theory in order to differentiate what we can say with meaning, from what we only can show.
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Accepted 2023-03-09
Published 2023-04-20
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